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Abstract 
This paper assesses the issues and options in reforming small electricity sector 
reforms in general while citing Nepal as a specific example. Political instability and 
increasing electricity demand are two major complicating factors in power sector 
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the long run.  
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1. Introduction 
 
The pioneers of electricity sector reforms in Latin American countries (LAC) such as 
Chile (1978-79) and Argentina (1992) inspired the notion of ‘successful and 
comprehensive electricity reforms’ in less-developed countries. Ever since, electricity 
reforms have been pursued or been on the agenda in developing countries. Although the 
reform aspirations and adopted models in developing countries were relatively similar; 
the institutional framework, regulatory arrangements, political ambience, sectoral 
conditions, and market structures among these varied significantly.  
 
However, the electricity sectors of many developing countries, including Nepal, can be 
defined as ‘small systems’ (Kessides, 2004). Bacon (1999) defines a power system as 
small when the overall system peak load reaches up to 1000 MW. As of 2004, 60 
developing countries have peak system loads that are below 150 MW; another 30 
between 150 and 500 MW, and possibly another 20 are between 501 and 1000 
megawatts. Moreover, the system peak load in Nepal is projected to increase to 2206 
MW by 2020 and 3679 MW by 2030 (NEA, 2010). Thus, the system can be expected to 
grow larger with time from the current size. 
 
The electricity sector in Nepal began undergoing major reforms after the establishment 
of Nepal Electricity Authority (NEA) in 1985. While the initial reforms followed the 
standard ‘scorecard’ type of reform in developing countries (see Bacon, 1999); the 
model has largely proven unsuccessful in the Nepalese context. After nearly two 
decades of experience with electricity reform in Nepal; the current structure and 
organisation of this hydropower dominated sector is regarded as being uncertain and 
unsustainable. Nepal is the second-richest country in hydropower after Brazil (Joshi and 
Khadka, 2009) and has a further 40 GW potential of technically and economically viable 
resources (EIA, 2010). However, the vertically-integrated system has developed only 
around 0.72 GW of generation capacity including those of the Independent Power 
Producers (IPPs). Distorted electricity tariffs, low access rate, frequent supply 
interruptions, and inefficiency in operation have been the trademarks of the Nepalese 
electricity sector along with other South Asian countries such as India, Pakistan, 
Bangladesh and Sri Lanka (Bacon and Besant-Jones, 2001). 
 
Although a decade long Maoist revolution delayed the electricity reform process; the 
current performance of the sector as compared against the potential benefits has raised 
doubts about the reforms. The energy sector in Nepal is regarded as being ‘resource rich 
but policy poor’. The political leadership changed 11 times in the last decade with Nepal 
being the world’s most recent republic in 2008. Political instability has severely affected 
the predominantly state owned sector resulting in discontinued policies, uncertainty, 
and weak and often stalled implementation of reform. Although domestic and foreign 
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private participation accounts for 20% of the generation market; the country has failed 
to achieve notable progress in development of its hydropower resources than 
anticipated. 
Reliable energy supply is necessary for stimulating economic growth in Nepal (Dhungel, 
2008). Moreover, the direct and indirect contribution of the sector to the Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP), monopoly characteristics of the industry coupled with high 
politicisation of the sector imply that the electricity reforms lies at the heart of the 
economic growth policies in Nepal. The annual energy requirement is also expected to 
increase from 3859 GWh to 9563 GWh from 2009 to2020 (NEA, 2010). Hence, the need 
for a rational reform of the power sector taking into account the increasing political 
volatility and escalating energy demand is crucial for a country experiencing a wide-
reaching change. However, the current performance of the Nepalese electricity reform 
to this date can present a major setback for an economy in the lurch towards an export-
led economic growth. 
The purpose of this paper is to assess the performance of the power sector reforms 
which garnered pace in the country after 1990. The contributions of this paper are two-
fold. Firstly, this paper provides important electricity reform lessons from several 
monolithic state-owned and controlled ‘small systems’ in Asia and Africa reeling upon 
growing political instability. Examples of reform experience from South Asian 
neighbours1 as well as successful international electricity sector reforms from Chile and 
Argentina and the hydroelectricity-rich Brazil will be used where permitted by the 
context. Secondly, this paper aims to fill in the existing gap in the literature regarding a 
comprehensive study of the power sector reform processes in Nepal over the years.  
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the economic arguments related to 
reforms in small power systems. Section 3 briefly discusses the sequence and contents 
of the main electricity reform episodes in Nepal after 1990. In Section 4, the major 
economic, operational and environmental aspects of power sector outcomes from 1990 
till 2008 is evaluated. Section 5 discusses the reform options addressing the concerns of 
high political volatility and growing electricity demand. Finally, Section 6 concludes 
with policy recommendations.  
 
2. Reforming Small Electricity Systems 
 
The demonstration effects from electricity reforms in a more politically stable Chile and 
a relatively socio-economically unstable Argentina and advanced economies like UK 
                                                            
1 The South Asian neighbors include the member countries of the South Asian Association for Regional 
Cooperation (SAARC). The member countries include Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, 
Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Afghanistan joining lately. 
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(1990) and Norway (1991) combined with significant technological progress in the 
sector has been one of the major driving forces for electricity reforms in developing 
countries including those with small systems. The burden of price subsidies, low service 
quality, low collection rates, high network energy losses and poor service coverage 
experienced under the monolithic state-owned and controlled system meant that these 
systems were no longer able or willing to support the existing arrangements (Joskow, 
1998; Newberry, 2002; Jamasb, 2006). Nonetheless, the political, economic and 
institutional contexts can vary significantly across these systems. 
Vertical and horizontal separation of the systems and large scale privatization was one 
of the main elements of electricity reforms in Chile and Argentina (Pollitt, 2008). The 
aim of vertical unbundling is to separate the potentially competitive generation and 
retail supply from the natural monopoly activities of transmission and distribution 
networks (Jamasb and Pollitt, 2005). Vertical separation is desirable to promote 
competition and forcing firms to provide their services at socially efficient prices 
(Kessides, 2004). However, the small size and low density of the market mean that the 
benefits of competition arising from vertical separation of the networks as well as 
economies of scale are limited in small power system like Nepal. The smallness of the 
market (in particular for small-island countries) cannot effectively allow the 
introduction of wholesale markets as only a small number of generating companies can 
be supported leading to oligopolistic market situations and susceptible to market power 
(Domah, 2002)2. Further, bundling many smaller electric companies by aggregating 
them under a monopsony regime via a single-buyer model (SBM) can allow the 
vertically integrated small power system to benefit from economies of scale. Hence, the 
transactions costs of full unbundling can exceed the subsequent efficiency gains in small 
electricity systems and competition may not be feasible and if feasible may not be 
desirable and effective in small systems.  
On the other hand, the benefits of a vertically integrated entity can be significant in 
terms of potential economies of coordinating the incentives for investments across the 
monopoly networks and potentially competitive segments (Brenan, 1995). The choice 
between vertical integration and unbundling is between the economies of coordination 
and scope on the one hand with possible increases in transactions costs and the 
potential efficiency gains from competition and increased efficiency across small 
systems on the other (Klass and Salinger, 1995). The absence of mature, well developed 
networks and regulation combined with high investment requirements in networks can 
severely limit the gains from unbundling in small systems. From a social welfare 
perspective, the efficiency gains from competition (productive and allocative) in 
conjunction with the distributional equity concerns needs to be carefully weighted 
against the potential gains from economies of vertical integration in small systems. 
                                                            
2 The geographical location can also prevent the possibilities of interconnection with other power grids as 
in island-based small electricity systems or a land-locked mountainous country like Nepal where 
connection to Chinese grid due to difficult geographical terrains is not possible. Thus, India remains the 
monopsony buyer of Nepalese electricity. 
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However, lessons from Chile and Argentina portray that careful regulation is essential 
under any electricity industry structure (i.e. vertically integrated or unbundled). 
Unbundling may imply fewer activities to be regulated but makes the system overtly 
sensitive towards regulatory efficacy while the costs of regulation in a vertically 
integrated small system can be significant compared to the benefits making effective 
regulation impossible (Kessides, 2004). The implementation of regulatory process is 
also difficult and costly because of information asymmetries (Joskow, 1991). Many 
developing countries reforming their small power systems also lack the necessary 
experience and skilled human resources limiting the scope and potential effectiveness 
of the electricity regulatory agencies (Pollitt and Stern, 2010).  
 
Further, a resistant political and administrative culture under unstable political 
environment implies that effective regulation under insufficient institutional 
arrangements is difficult to achieve in naturally monopolistic small systems. The small 
electricity systems in Nepal and other South Asian countries are inefficient and suffer 
from institutionalized corruption and persistent rent seeking behaviour together with 
poor economic governance of the power sector (Smith, 2004). 
 
3. Major Reforms Initiatives in the Nepalese power sector 
 
Reforms in the Nepalese energy sector are primarily driven by motives to enhance the 
social welfare by efficient management of the available scarce resources. A large unused 
capacity and increasing demand imply that the economic logic behind the electricity 
reform measures in Nepal as with other power systems is to exploit the benefits from 
economies of scale. Whether the practice is in line with theory is discussed under 
Section 4. Nonetheless, a sequence of major electricity reforms initiatives was mooted 
after the creation of NEA by merging the Electricity Department, Electricity Boards and 
Nepal Electricity Corporation in 1985 in accordance with the provisions of NEA Act of 
1984 (Thakur, 2002). The establishment of NEA eventually paved the way towards 
creating a legal framework and corporatization of the power sector through the 
formulation of the hydropower development policy of 1992 and enforced by the Water 
Resources Act and the Electricity Act with amendments made to the NEA Act of 1984 
(ADB,1999). They are discussed as below: 
i) The objective of the Hydropower Development Policy of 1992 was to promote and 
facilitate hydropower development allowing for state, joint sector (public-private) and 
private sector development of hydroelectricity projects through licensees. The policy 
emphasized on intensifying electrification through small hydro plants and mass 
capacity installation with the necessity to extend proper distribution system in the rural 
areas. The importance of foreign investment in the hydropower sector was recognised 
by allowing foreign investors 100% capital investments. The implementation of the act 
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meant the need for an appropriate legal framework supported by more acts (NEA, 
2010): 
• The Water Resources Act of 1992 provides appropriate legal arrangements for 
rational utilization, conservation, management and development of the water 
resources (surface and underground water) in Nepal. 
• The objective of the Foreign Investment and Technology Transfer Act 1992 was to 
promote and facilitate economy-wide foreign investment and technology 
transfer by making optimum use of natural and human resources in the 
transition towards industrialisation. 
•  The Electricity Act 1992 was primarily promulgated to promote private 
participation in hydro power development. It provides for exemption of licences 
for any individual or corporate body undertaking generation, transmission and 
distribution up to 1000 KW capacity. Obtaining a licence was obligatory for any 
capacity above 1 MW in the electricity industry but monopoly was retained in 
the licensee distribution services areas (geographic monopoly) with third-party 
entry possible under conditions of unsatisfactory performance of the licensee. 
The Electricity and Tariff Fixation Commission (ETFC)3 was established and NEA 
was made a licensee. The ETFC consisted of at least five persons among them 
representative of the Government, an economist and those involved in the 
generation, transmission and distribution of electricity and supply. NEA was 
required to act as a single-buyer via bulk-buying of power from generators at a 
purchase price sufficient to cover total investments in approximately 25 years 
after accounting for depreciation costs. The licensee was also allowed to export 
electricity subject to the payment of the export duty. 
• The notion of fair and competitive industrial arrangements meant the 
formulation of the Industrial Enterprises Act 1992 with a view to create a 
congenial, straight-forward and encouraging industrial investment environment.  
ii) The Hydropower Policy of 1992 was revised in 2001 as the Water Resource 
Development Policy with a major objective of capacity expansion by attracting more 
investments. The policy also led to certain institutional arrangements in particular by 
inducting the ETFC to the regulatory body. Today, the enterprise level restricting at NEA 
means that the electricity industry as a whole runs under five core business groups for 
generation, electricity transmission and system operation, distribution, electrification 
and engineering services. The major objectives of the Water Resource Development 
Policy are to develop hydropower resources at economically efficient costs, to 
harmonise electrification with economic activities and to develop hydropower for 
export. 
                                                            
3 The newly formed government in March, 2011 declared that ETFC will be dissolved. This is another 
example of policy discontinuity with changes in  political leadership.  
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iii)  The Community Electricity Distribution Byelaws was introduced in 2003 with the 
objectives of promoting public participation in reducing non-technical power losses 
(such as theft) and institutionalising distribution, encourage community management in 
the extension of distribution lines through the distribution institution, etc. The 
community electrification concept was introduced and regulation was passed for rural 
electrification. Alongside, the community shall also be responsible for distribution and 
sales of electric energy. 
Hence, the reform objectives as reflected from various electricity reform measures as 
discussed above have primarily been the following: 
• to attract foreign and domestic private investment 
• to promote efficiency, fairness and economic principles in managing the sector 
thereby reducing the dependence on state support 
• to rationalise and institutionalise sector activities through appropriate measures 
for the overall development of the sector  
• to strengthen quality of supply at an affordable cost to consumers while allowing 
utilities to sufficiently recover their costs. 
 
However, the political instability in Nepal has disrupted the gradual implementation of 
these policies and the objectives are still far from being achieved (NEA, 2010).  During 
the 1990s, several South Asian countries including Nepal experienced political 
instability which directly affected the traditional state-owned utilities under political 
control. Persistent political instability, infighting and power struggles, corruption, 
inadequate social and economic benefits and weak governance in Nepal contributed to a 
loss of confidence in government and the political system as a whole since the 
restoration of democracy in 1991 (ADB, 2004). Due to violent insurgency, urgent issues 
such as poverty, utilities reform and rule of law can take a backseat and remain 
unaddressed. Political instability and changing priorities of different governments have 
resulted in ‘almost-ready’ decisions being repeatedly rehashed in the Nepalese power 
sector (Krishnan, 2007).  
Political instability has also opened up new opportunities for unfair rent seeking and 
corruption in the form of licensing and approving unfeasible projects, signing of loss 
making power purchase agreements with the private sector and undertaking socially 
unfair activities at the cost of state utility for electoral and political purposes. Persistent 
political instability can also place practical constraints on timeframe for undertaking 
any reform as any reform that extends beyond the lifespan of the government becomes 
politically infeasible and thereby slowing down or stalling the reform progress as a 
whole (Bhattacharya, 2007). For instance, the 2004 election in Sri Lanka elected new 
members of Parliament who opposed the restructuring and privatisation of the power 
sector and thus halting reforms. Likewise, the state of Haryana in India missed reform 
milestones after a change of government in 1999 with similar trends observed in 
Bangladesh and Nepal. The most distinctive aspect in India has been the struggle to 
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achieve a framework that protects the sector from political instability and political 
influence (Sen and Jamasb, 2010). Overall, political instability has largely translated into 
short-term opportunism and corruption by the political elite in Nepal at the cost of long-
term objectives of the sector leading to poor and unsustainable performance of the 
electricity sector.  
The reform matrix in Table 1 below shows that major electricity reforms in a state 
owned and controlled system is only possible and sustainable under a politically stable 
environment given long term political objectives while complicated and lengthy reforms 
are not likely to work at times of political instability. 
 
 
 
 
Political 
Objectives 
                                             Political Environment 
 
 Stable Unstable 
Temporary Quick short-term fixing Rent seeking, opportunism 
and milk-skimming 
Long-term Major sustainable 
reforms possible to 
undertake 
Any reforms highly unlikely 
to be successful 
Table 1: Reforms matrix 
Source: Adapted from Bhattacharya (2007) 
 
 
4. Two Decades of Power Sector Reforms 
 
In this section, we analysed the performance of the Nepalese power sector by studying 
the economic, operational and environmental aspects of electricity sector bearing 
tremendous consequences to social welfare impacts4. The reform outcomes discussed 
below will provide a basis to gauge the success of the power sector reform program 
over the 20 years of reform. 
a) Prices: Electricity prices in Nepal have been historically too low to cover the costs 
and the prices have not changed since the last decade. The power prices are not based 
on economic principles but rather on vested interests and political motives. Electricity 
is supplied to customers at highly subsidized rates creating distortions in demand. For 
example, the charge of per KWh of electricity supplied to a community wholesale 
consumer is 3.5 Nepalese Rupees5 (NRs) while a small industry pays NRs. 6.60 per KWh 
of electricity consumed. Thus, the residential demand for electricity has escalated over 
                                                            
4 Similar criteria to explore the success of power sector reforms can be found in Pollitt (2004, 2008); 
Nepal and Jamasb (2011). 
5 One Nepalese rupee is on average equivalent to about 1.35 Dollar cents (United States). 
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time as the population growth averages to around 2% since 1990. The NEA has a 
revenue rate of NRs 6.71 per KWh of electricity against the cost price (including 
transmission and distribution charges) of NRs. 9.05 per KWh of electricity. The under-
pricing of electricity after accounting for a miscellaneous NRs. 0.43 KWh of income per 
KWh of electricity imply that NEA suffered a loss of NRs. 1.91 per KWh of electricity in 
2009 (NEA, 2009). The price-cost gap has exacerbated the financial health of NEA with 
an overwhelming loss of NRs. 4681 million in 2009 (NEA, 2009). NEA also maintains a 
discriminatory power purchase agreements (PPA) policy among domestic and Indian 
companies.  The Nepalese IPP’s are paid NRs. 6.5 per KWh of electricity while the Indian 
IPP’s are paid NRs. 10.72 per KWh.  
Figure 1 shows that the residential sector with a market share of 95.5% of the total 
electricity consumers accounted for 42% of overall revenue collection of NEA while the 
industrial consumers with just 1.7% of total consumers stood for 35% towards NEA’s 
total revenue in 2008/09 (NEA, 2009). 
 
 
Figure 1: Revenue collection by consumer types 
Source: NEA (2009) 
 
b) Investments: Lack of investment in the generation segment implies that Nepal has 
only been able to currently utilize about 1.7% of its technically and economically viable 
hydro-electric potential capacity. A fundamental reason for under-investment is low 
power tariffs which are not sufficient to support the system-cost and capacity 
expansion. The domination of hydro plants implies that renewable energy forms the 
main source of power production in Nepal with thermal sources (especially diesel 
generation) contributing marginally. Nepal also solely imports 1.2 million tonnes of 
petroleum products from India as the country is devoid of any refining capacity6 (NOC, 
2010). Higher prices of petroleum products coupled with vulnerability in petroleum 
supplies have reduced the scope of adding capacity based on diesel sources. Coal 
                                                            
6 The demand for petroleum products is set to increase by 20% on an annual basis. 
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imports have gone up due to liberal imports policy through license waiver on imports 
(Pokharel, 2007). However, this policy has had limited effect on thermal capacity 
additions as no significant new thermal capacity addition was added after 2000 as 
shown in Figure 2.  
 
 
Fig 2: Total installed capacity by type (GW) 
Source: Own compilation 
 
Figure 2 shows that hydroelectricity (both NEA owned and IPP owned) is the major 
source of electricity generation in Nepal. The investments in hydro capacity accelerated 
post 2001 after the establishment of the Independent Power Producers’ Association of 
Nepal (IPPAN) and slowed down after 2003 primarily due to widespread insecurity as 
the Maoist war intensified. The termination of war after 2007 again increased 
investments in generation. The capacity shortage in generation was apparent when 
demand for electricity surpassed 970 MW given an installed capacity of about 700 MW 
creating a severe power shortage in 2009. The peak demand is expected to reach 1700 
MW by 2015 with additional capacity expansion of 170 MW by 2012 to be achieved 
(NEA, 2010). The projects to be completed include Chameliaya Hydroelectric project 
(30 MW), Khulekhani-III hydro project (14 MW), Trishuli 3-A project (60 MW), 
Rahughat hydro project (30 MW) and Upper Modi (40 MW). 
c) Technical Network Energy Losses: Quality of power supply has been historically poor 
in Nepal and the inefficiency shows no signs of improvement. The power sector in Nepal 
has been plagued by high technical and non-technical losses over the years. The 
technical losses on average stand at above 20%. In 1979/80, overall electricity losses 
accounted for 31% of total power generation and increased to 35.7% in 1983/84 
(Sharma, 1988). Figure 3 shows that since 1990 distribution losses have averaged 
around 20% of total power production. The losses reached a record level of 24% in 
1997 and have decreased since then. The fluctuating level of losses over the years 
implies that power losses vary with the total amount of power supplied to the grid. 
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Fig 3: Electricity Distribution losses 1990-2008 
Source: Own compilation 
 
The high level of technical losses in distribution can be attributed to old grids that need 
to be maintained and upgraded and are in need of investments. The high technical 
losses also imply that system reliability is low with frequent unplanned power outages. 
Grid expansion has also been slow in Nepal while lack of transmission and distribution 
facilities is a major bottleneck for generation capacity expansion in the country. The 
politically determined low prices have barred the sector from generating adequate 
revenue to finance additional network expansion. The country currently has 1,980 km 
transmission lines and among the major transmission lines under construction are the 
Marshyangdi-Kathmandu 220 KV line (85 km), Khimti-Dhalkebar 220 KV line (75 km) 
and Tamakoshi-Kathmandu 220 KV line (80 km). The insufficient transmission capacity 
led to 28 system collapses throughout 2010 due to congestion (NEA, 2010). There are 
currently 34 Distribution Centres in Nepal and 37 Branch Offices of NEA spread over 49 
out of 75 districts in Nepal.  
d) Quality of Supply (non-technical losses): Electricity theft in particular is a serious 
problem across poor residential areas in South Asia where consumers do not have the 
ability and willingness to pay for electricity connection and energy usage. For instance, 
the per capita income of Nepal in 2010 was 211 US dollars while 42% of the total 
population are living under the poverty line as compared to Bhutan and Bangladesh. As 
a result, the T&D losses in 2000 across the South Asian region reached 27.5% from 
25.2% in 1980 (World Bank, 2003). For instance, in 1998 the army in Pakistan found 
10,093 instances of power theft and recovered 2.4 billion Pakistani Rupees in fines and 
penalties (Rizvi, 2000). Smith (2004) estimated that electricity theft in Bangladesh 
amounted to 14% of the total 35% T&D losses in 2003.  
 
Non-technical losses in the form of electricity theft are a grave issue in many developing 
countries including Nepal. Lost earnings from power theft result in lack of profits and a 
need to expand generating capacity to offset the impact of power losses under 
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investments crunch. Generally, a system with 16% or more transmission and 
distribution losses (T&D) is plagued with extensive electricity theft (Smith, 2004). 
Figure 3 show that the distribution losses alone in Nepal have surpassed the 16% 
criterion indicating a serious problem of power theft. To some extent, the bourgeoning 
financial loss of NEA discussed above can be attributed to the high levels of electricity 
theft in the country resulting in lost earnings. 
 
e) Rural Electrification: Rural electrification remains one of the major energy policy 
goals in Nepal as in other South Asian countries. Table 2 shows the electrification rates 
in 6 SAARC countries in 2008. Sri Lanka has been relatively successful in catering 
electricity to the rural sector which has translated into an overall high score in Human 
Development Index (HDI). Similar results can be inferred for other countries concerning 
electrification rate and overall level of human development. Electricity access and 
consumption is crucial towards human development in slow developing countries 
(Pasternak, 2000). Thus, the low levels of electrification status in Nepal also imply a low 
level of human development in the country.  
 
Country Electrification rate (%) Population 
without 
electricity 
(millions) 
Energy 
Development 
Index7 (EDI) 
Human 
Development 
Index (HDI)8 National Urban Rural 
Afghanista
n 
15.6 22 12 23.8 na 0.349 
Bangladesh 41 76 28 95.7 0.169 0.469 
India 66.5 93.1 52.5 403.7 0.272 0.519 
Nepal 43.6 89.7 34 16.5 0.107 0.107 
Pakistan 62.4 78 46 68.4 0.281 0.281 
Sri Lanka 76.6 85.8 75 4.7 0.277 0.658 
Table 2: Electrification status in 2009 
Source: International Energy Agency (IEA) 
 
The rate of electrification rate increased from around 30% in 2005 to 43.6% in 2008 
(IEA, 2008). However, the larger benefits of increased electricity access rate in Nepal 
are confined to the urban population across South Asia including Nepal.  
Factors such as finance, governance, industrial organisation and policies can account for 
varying pace of electrification across much of the under-developed countries (Eberhard, 
2004). The absence of proper electricity distribution infrastructures has also delayed 
                                                            
7 EDI is devised as an index to better understand the role that energy plays in human development. The 
components are per capita commercial energy consumption, per capita residential sector electricity 
consumption; share of modern fuels in total residential sector, and share of population without access to 
electricity (IEA, 2009). 
8 HDI measures the strength of human capital in a country based on a comprehensive set of different 
categories.  
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the process of rural electrification in the country. The difficult geographical terrain and 
lack of incentives (such as low power prices) mean that the private sector is not willing 
to undertake the costly grid expansion in the country. Absence of rural electrification 
also implies an increasing pressure on forests (i.e. the natural source of carbon storage) 
for fuel woods. Fuel woods remain the dominant form of traditional and non-
commercial energy source in Nepal9. In 2005, 78% of energy consumption was met 
through fuel woods while the residential sector consumed 90% share of overall energy 
consumption in the country (Bhandari and Stadler, 2011). 
 
f) Imports: Electricity trade is a vital component of Nepalese economic growth plans. 
Being unable to utilize its own hydroelectricity potential, Nepal is engaged in power 
trade with India which has mostly involved imports. The dominant share of hydro 
power in generation and a poor energy capacity mix means that the sector is prone to 
shortage during drought seasons. Hence, NEA is obliged to import electricity from India 
at a price much higher than paid to the domestic producers to satiate the increasing 
domestic electricity demand. Figure 4 shows that, overall, Nepal is a net importer of 
electricity. Electricity imports peaked in 1999 which had a positive effect on economic 
growth and boosting industrial production due to the availability of electricity. 
Likewise, Nepal was a net exporter of electricity in 2003 which also had a positive effect 
on economic growth.  
 
 
Fig 4: Net Electricity Imports in Billion Kilowatt hours (BKWh) 
Source: Energy Information Administration (EIA) 
 
                                                            
9 One reason for low EDI of Nepal is that energy consumption from fuel-woods is not included in such 
calculation. 
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However, in recent times the increasing reliance on imported electricity from India has 
highlighted the security of supply risks. The Nepal-India Power trade consist of 100-150 
MW with Nepal on the net importing side. In the future, the potential benefits from 
electricity trade to Nepal can be large as the fast growing and energy hungry India has 
decided to import a minimum of 10,000 MW by 2020 from South Asian countries.  
 
g) Energy Intensity: The energy use per unit of GDP is increasing in Nepal after 1990. 
The increase in energy consumption is due to an expansion in residential and industrial 
customer base. Figure 5 shows that although population growth rate has slowed down 
over the years; increasing trend in energy intensity is spurred by an increase in overall 
GDP growth rate. The fall in GDP growth rate is also marked by a fall in increasing 
intensity for respective years emphasizing the critical role of energy consumption in 
economic growth.  
 
    
Fig 5(a): Energy Intensity (2005 USD)   Fig 5(b): GDP and Population Growth rate (%)  
Source: EIA                                                      Source: EIA  
 
In recent times the GDP growth and energy intensity is not symmetrical due to 
insufficient energy available in the country. On the other hand, the absence of any 
appropriate demand-side management (DSM) policies means that available energy is 
not used efficiently.  
Thus, the empirical evidence of power sector performance has starkly defied the logic of 
power sector reforms in Nepal. The performance of the Nepalese power sector after 20 
years of reform resembles the conventional problems of a monopolistic public utility 
suffering from chronic underinvestment and insufficient capitalization, politically 
determined low and distorted tariffs coupled with poor operational and financial 
performance as reflected in various studies (see Munasinghe, 1992; Schram, 1993; 
Jamasb et al., 2004). Thus, the current performance of the sector has belied the theory 
behind reforms. A low political commitment to reforms coupled with weak 
implementation of necessary measures due to political instability explains the widening 
gap between theory and practice behind electricity sector reforms in Nepal.  
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Table 3 outlines the status of power sector reform in Nepal which suggests that the 
electricity reform model has been fairly simple over the years. The Nepalese electricity 
model vastly coincides with reform models in other South Asian countries like 
Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka (Bhattacharya, 2007). 
 
 
 
 
Sector 
Status 
 
IPP 
introduction 
 
Independent 
regulation 
 
Reform 
enacted
 
Structure 
of the 
market 
 
Generation 
ownership 
Networks 
ownership 
(transmission / 
distribution) 
 
 
1992 
 
 
1994 
 
 
No 
Vertically 
integrated, 
Functional 
unbundling 
introduced 
 
Dominant 
state 
ownership 
 
Completely 
state-owned 
Table 3: Power sector reform status in Nepal 
Source: Nepal Electricity Authority (2010) 
 
 
5. Reform Options 
 
The state-owned and politicised power sector reform in developing countries with 
small power system has been a difficult and complicated process (Williams and 
Ghanadan, 2006). Chile and Argentina pursued the deepest and most radical reforms 
while electricity reforms in Brazil were more cautious and gradual with almost a 
textbook approach (Dutta and Menzes, 2005). Mexico, on the other hand largely 
maintains the vertical integration in the power sector while allowing private generators 
to participate in new capacity additions as in the Nepalese context (Rossellon and 
Halpern, 2001).  
Lessons from Brazilian electricity reforms suggest that the creation of a truly 
competitive market can be difficult when almost 90% of the electricity is hydropower as 
in Nepal (Schaeffer and Salem Szklo, 2001). This is because hydropower technology 
often implies production conditions characterised by large economies of scale and 
therefore a regime close to that of a natural monopoly (Gabriele, 2004). The 
dependence on hydropower also means a vulnerable supply and frequent blackouts 
during drought years with added problems of political instability as experienced in the 
modern day Nepal. The section below discusses some electricity reform options based 
on the issues in the Nepalese context which can be of general relevance to other small 
power systems. 
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5.1 Adjusting electricity prices and subsidies 
In competitive electricity markets, prices convey the correct signals and carry 
appropriate informational efficiency as they reflect the actual cost of providing the 
service as well as the long-run marginal cost of new capacity irrespective of the political 
environment. Economic theory also suggests that cost-reflective prices is desirable as it 
leads to net social welfare gains although assessing the distributional impacts of tariff 
adjustment is a complicated task (Chang, 1997). However, the electricity prices in Nepal 
are below the cost level in order to maintain social peace as the government controls 
the price. The inability of the sector to finance the system on its own due to 
underinvestment and the growing losses of NEA indicate that adjusting electricity prices 
towards supply costs is necessary in a small system which is in a transition to becoming 
large. A two part tariff design where a fixed payment is added to the system marginal 
income (such as capacity payments) can ensure the sustainability of the system as 
widely practised in most Latin American countries. Cost reflective prices can also 
eliminate the system’s deficit financed by the whole population and free up resources 
which can be used to improve access in poor and rural areas via electrification (Jamasb, 
2006). 
However, a tariff increase also means debasing the economic welfare of the already 
poor population in the country and hence is politically sensitive. Experience from Peru 
suggests that carefully designed targeted subsidies that address the undesirable social 
impacts and while limiting the impact of price distortions can reduce the overall impact 
of price increases (Revolo, 2009). The reform experience is Chile also shows that a 
competitive allocation of government direct capital subsidy to private electricity 
distribution companies to cover some portion of the investment costs has been very 
successful in intensifying rural electrification whereby the state, private investors and 
all users contribute to funding rural electrification (Jadresic, 2000). Rural electrification 
rate in Chile is over 90% (Millan, 2007). Utility subsidies have often poorly been 
targeted in South Asia and have failed to reach the poor as shown by the Indian 
experience where only a quarter of one billion dollar subsidies for water services 
reached the poor households (Foster et al., 2000). However, the use of targeted capital 
subsidies practice in Chile and Peru suggest that it is possible to strike a balance 
between economic efficiency and social equity across the developing world.  
 
5.2 Restructuring the electricity sector 
NEA currently remains a vertically integrated utility responsible for the generation, 
transmission and distribution of electricity in the country. Functional unbundling has 
been introduced as a mechanism to facilitate internal unbundling dividing NEA into 3 
segments: generation; transmission and substation; and distribution and consumer 
services. While functional unbundling exists on paper, it is necessary to have an 
accounting separation of the potentially competitive segments and the monopoly 
17 
 
segments. Accounting separation can improve much needed transparency and 
accountability in operation of the sector to attract foreign investors as well as prevent 
domestic corruption.  
Slow and non-transparent decision making process is one of the key areas of concern in 
the sector (Krishnan, 2007). However, an outright separation of the network in 
ownership terms in the interim period is not desirable in the absence of any effective 
regulatory framework while the size and density of the market is small. Given the 
political instability, delegating decision making authority to the appropriate lowest 
levels of the government can facilitate timely action in a state owned vertically 
integrated entity like NEA. 
Although the generation segment is open to private investors, barriers to entry still 
exist in terms of discriminatory network access to independent power producers. NEA 
as a single buyer tends to favour its own generation thus distorting competition and 
discourages new entry in generation. Non-integrated private firms are thus unable to 
compete for consumers in the market. Eliminating entry barriers in terms of non-
discriminatory network access can spur private generation to meet the growing 
electricity demand. Though NEA can remain vertically integrated in the short-run while 
clear rules for access to networks and appropriate charges should be set in the form of 
regulated third-party access (rTPA) against negotiated third-party-access (nTPA) to 
avoid disputes, uncertainty, and corruption. Further, an independent system operator 
(ISO) can be created with time to take charge of dispatch and grid operation under 
clearly defined rules for access to the grid. 
in the long run, as the systems grows larger unbundling of NEA can be pursued firstly by 
commercializing NEA’s generation, transmission, distribution and support segments 
followed by privatization of each of these entities in the presence of an effective 
regulatory body. Lessons from Chile suggest that there is a need to separate generation 
from both transmission and distribution to avoid hold up problems for other generators 
in larger electricity systems (Pollitt, 2004). Argentina learnt lessons from Chile and 
pursued vertical separation and creating a competitive market allowing customers to 
switch suppliers while no hold-up problems exist in generation (Millan, 2007). 
However, the relative merits of vertical separation can vary across different systems 
and should be judged cautiously in every case (Pittman, 2003). 
 
5.3 Need to involve the private sector 
Economic theory suggests that privately owned electricity sector is more efficient than 
the state owned ones primarily due to their profit motives (Baumol, 1996). However, 
the empirical evidence on the merits of privatization in the context of electricity reforms 
are inconclusive (Mota, 2004; Jamasb et al. 2004). Hence, a viable option to mitigate the 
effects of increasing political volatility in the Nepalese power sector from increasing 
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political volatility would be to completely or partially privatize the sector. The 
bureaucratic influence in power sector decision makings will be minimized with 
increasing private ownership. Private ownership coupled with competition and 
effective regulation of the transmission and distribution networks can result in cost 
efficiency, reduced technical and non-technical losses, competitive prices and enhanced 
revenue collection (Newberry, 2002). Privatisation of existing assets will also raise 
revenue for the cash-strapped government with large foreign debts. However, the 
limited experience of the Nepal with the privatisation process may require the 
assistance of international agencies such as World Bank or international Monetary Fund 
(IMF) to monitor the process as experienced in the electricity reform context in 
Cameroon (Pineau, 2002). 
At present, private participation in the Nepalese power sector is only possible as an 
independent power producer which gathered pace after the establishment of IPPAN. 
26% of the total electricity was served by the private sector in 2010 (NEA, 2010). 
However, the inability of NEA, to strike a favourable PPA with the IPPs due to political 
resistance to increase end user tariffs in 2011 imply that 1700 MW of hydroelectricity 
construction projects is being stalled (IPPAN, 2011). Thus, it is necessary that NEA buys 
power from the private sector at full cost with a fair financial return while raising the 
end user electricity tariffs to meet the escalating electricity demand in the country. In 
the short run, private participation through IPPS needs to be bolstered with appropriate 
incentives for the private sector to participate in electricity generation. Given that both 
foreign and domestic investors are risk-averse, only a high risk premium can coax the 
private sector to undertake major investment decisions in the electricity sector 
operating under political instability. This is because political instability adds a risk 
premium to foreign and domestic mode of finance. A high risk premium will also 
necessitate an increase in the low existing end consumer’s tariffs across the small 
systems. 
Electricity reform lessons from Nicaragua suggest that assessing appropriate risks and 
designing suitable risk premium forms an integral reform component to lure private 
sector investments to the energy sector (Mostert, 2007). However, the transition 
towards larger power system in the long run can allow the privatisation of the 
individual segments. The hydroelectricity dominated Norwegian electricity sector 
reform experience illustrates that privatization is not a pre-requisite and can wait until 
the structure, regulation and ownership of the distribution is clear (Jamasb, 2006). 
Meanwhile, the Chilean experience also suggest that total privatizations in the electric 
sector can be carried out according to the country’s framework of economic and social 
development based on market principles and the subsidiarity of the state (Morande and 
Raineri, 1997). 
Moreover, privatisation in the Latin American countries (LAC) proceeded quite fast as 
the LAC contributed to about 40% of the total value of energy privatizations in the 
world during the 1990s (Gabriele, 2004). The experience of Chile and Argentina though 
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suggests that large scale privatization, if occurred under a robust institutional 
framework, can be beneficial in terms of enhancing sectoral efficiency. The strong legal 
protection and observance of private property rights as a legacy from the military rule 
of the past with appropriate regulatory framework as in Chile can deliver benefits in a 
politically unstable country with small or medium electricity system (Estache et al., 
2000). 
 
5.4 Independent and effective regulation 
Lessons from the Asian financial crisis underscore the need for a properly designed and 
managed regulatory system with independent regulatory agency when economic 
regulation of prices is based on a contract regulation via PPAs between the IPPs and the 
incumbent (Stern, 2000). Furthermore, lessons from the Latin American utilities 
privatisation suggests the need to have a proper regulatory agency in place prior to 
moving ahead with any contractual arrangements (Gausch et al. 2006). Although 
independent regulation was theoretically introduced in 1994 with the establishment of 
ETFC; the commission cannot be considered to be independent given the political 
nature and terms of regulatory appointment, public source of funding of the regulatory 
body and low participation of the politically unaffiliated regulators in designing 
regulatory content such as tariff methodology (Stern, 1997). A single-buyer model such 
as NEA requires stringent regulatory requirements for its efficient operation and 
investment as the problems can be serious for state-owned single buyer companies 
operating in countries with imperfect markets and governance with wide-scale 
corruption (Stern, 2000). There is no explicit regulation on anything else besides the 
generation prices in the Nepalese electricity sector while there are no regulatory 
procedures for handling major macroeconomic shocks. 
The dominant position of the Ministry of Energy with its twin role as owner and 
decision maker in all spheres of the power sector implies that electricity sector 
regulation is not independent from vested political interests and thus making the whole 
regulatory process ineffective in Nepal. As a result, decision making suffers from 
political influence and instability often lengthening and delaying the decision making 
process (Krishnan, 2007). An effective regulatory commission as the guardian of public 
interests should balance and protect interests and welfare of all stakeholders thereby 
creating a level playing field for all stakeholders in undertaking major investment 
decisions. 
An independent regulatory body requires adequate staff with particular and specialist 
skills comprising economists, lawyers, accountants, financial analysis and engineers to 
make regulation effective. By doing so, the institutional continuity of the regulatory 
system will depend upon the regulatory staff and not on the ruling span of the political 
party. Hence, there is a need to establish an effective independent electricity regulatory 
body in the country for electricity reforms to work effectively. Lessons from Chile and 
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Argentina also show that government ministers should not be involved in approving or 
implementing regulatory decisions and should be properly delegated to an independent 
regulatory agency like CNE for Chile and ENRE for Argentina (Pollitt, 2008). However, 
the existing constraints on skilled human resources in Nepal imply that appropriate 
training of the staff of the new regulatory bodies and agencies is required to overcome 
any incompetency and inefficiency in the regulatory process.  
Nonetheless, the expansion of the system in the long run together with the unbundling 
and privatisation of sector may necessitate sophisticated regulatory arrangements of 
the monopolistic transmission and distribution networks in the form of incentive 
regulation for the overall sustainability of the system. However, it is recommended to 
have a cautious and planned restructuring of the sector in a first place as effective 
regulation is a complex and difficult task facing any energy regulators.  
 
5.5 Sequencing of reform measures 
While the sequence of electricity reforms should be consistent with the needs and 
specific characteristics of the sector such as resource availability and institutional 
endowments; there seem to be some consensus with regard to the sequence of the main 
reform steps as a part of a good reform design. According to the generic reform model 
suggested by Bacon (1999), the key elements of reforms sequence are: i) effective 
regulation and an independent regulatory body with proper electricity law, ii) 
restructuring which first involves separating and regulating distribution networks 
followed by the separation and regulation of the transmission networks and finally 
creating a wholesale market by horizontally splitting the segment and iii) privatizing 
generation, transmission and distribution segments. Most LACs including Chile and 
Argentina have generally followed the model suggested above although in Brazil some 
privatization followed suit before the establishment of the regulator. 
The Nepalese power sector requires an effective independent regulatory body from the 
outset while unbundling can be deferred to a later date depending upon the future size 
of the system. The presence of sound regulation can thus facilitate private participation 
in the sector as a mechanism to protect the sector from political volatility and also 
increasing power production to meet demand by employing private capital. The reform 
experience of the transition economies comprising countries from Southern and Central 
Europe and the Former Soviet Union also suggest the presence of mass corruption due 
to ill-guided large scale privatisation in the absence of an effective regulatory body 
(EBRD, 2001). Consequently, establishing a strong electricity regulatory commission is 
more urgent than unbundling NEA in the present context.  
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6. Conclusions and Lessons Learnt 
It is evident that reforming small electricity systems like NEA and other low income 
countries across the globe is a complicated issue especially under the twin conditions of 
growing political instability and rapidly increasing electricity demand. While the 
conditions and institutional arrangements vary across small systems; it is necessary 
that need-based reforms relying on individual country’s ability and resources receive 
foremost priority. In that sense, electricity reforms can be simpler to implement rather 
than being carried away by complex and sophisticated reforms attempted elsewhere 
which does not address the local conditions. A cautious and gradual reform process 
based on a piece-meal approach with constant self-adaptation through error corrections 
as in the Brazilian context is more suitable for many small systems. 
As such, electricity reforms across the small systems can be two-staged. In the short and 
medium term, focus should be towards tariff and subsidies restructuring and creating 
an effective independent regulatory body. The regulatory authorities should design a 
framework which includes clear regulatory objectives coupled with designing the 
regulatory mechanism and implementing contracts and property rights for ownership 
purposes. IPPs entry should be facilitated and encouraged by minimizing unnecessary 
market and non-market barriers while providing appropriate entrepreneual incentives. 
The role of the state should be limited and be based on the principle of subsidiarity 
prioritising economic logics before vested interests and personal gains as learned from 
the electricity reforms in Chile.  
As the system grows larger in the long run, focus can be towards complete vertical 
separation of the networks and privatisation of them while creating a wholesale market 
by horizontally splitting the generation segment. Moreover, accounting separation of 
the segments is encouraged in the short term in order to promote transparency and 
accountability. It can thus be inferred that in small systems like Nepal involving the 
private sector under proper regulatory body and raising electricity tariffs could lead the 
sector towards recovery and self-sustainability. 
Electricity sector reforms in advanced industrial societies like UK and Norway also 
suggest that resources should be driven towards building institutional capacity and 
economic governance. This will promote transparency and limit the practice of theft and 
corruption in the sector while also making the system resistant to frequent political 
shocks. Likewise it is vital that electricity reforms in small systems should primarily be 
based upon a thorough assessment of economic costs and benefits as an effective way to 
manage the scarce economic resources properly. Although the role of state is still crucial 
and important across small systems; it is necessary to redefine and revisit this role in 
the light of market-oriented reforms so as to insulate the sector from political instability 
and increasing electricity demand across small systems.  
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